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COMMENT 
Solving the Corporate Inversion 
Phenomenon: An Exercise in Free 
Market Patriotism, Protectionism 
Through Facilitation 
By Brian Thompson* 
ABSTRACT 
The United States government grapples with the right solution to deter cor-
porations from inverting abroad. A corporation’s decision to invert is made 
in the interest of its shareholders, including many who are United States 
citizens. However, many have called inverting corporations unpatriotic, 
traders, and cheaters. These labels shift the blame to an easy scapegoat. In 
order to quell this recent phenomenon, the United States government must 
move beyond rhetoric and reevaluate the cause of the exodus. Politicians 
have no one to blame but themselves and the outdated corporate policy 
they have left in place. Heavy-handed government policies to punish cor-
porations for doing what is best for their shareholders is not only counter-
productive but also contrary to corporate duties imposed by existing law. 
The government must move in the opposite direction. The government 
must disregard punitive policies and reform the law to facilitate a compet-
itive corporate market. The answer to global corporate competitiveness is 
less government interference. The only way to protect the United States’ 
corporate base is for the government to facilitate a corporate friendly en-
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For the free market to perform as intended, lawmakers customarily allow the 
merger of United States corporations into foreign entities, a process known as a 
corporate or tax inversion. However, this right is not absolute. According to former 
U.S. Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, “these activities [inversions] should be based 
on economic efficiency, not tax savings.”1 A 2014 Congressional Research Service 
report “estimated that 47 companies had undertaken inversions in the past decade,”2 
including 12 companies that have inverted since 2011.3 
The above statistics have not been ignored, and as the rate of inversions has 
increased, so has public scrutiny. A poll conducted nationwide among registered 
voters found that 59% believed that Congress should act to “penalize and discour-
age companies” from inverting.4 Even former President Barack Obama declared 
that corporate inversions are an exercise in “gaming the system.”5 
This type of rhetoric directed at “evil corporations” is an easy way to score 
political points, but it begs the question: what drives businesses to engage in inver-
sions? As Judge Learned Hand said in 1934, “any one may so arrange his affairs 
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern 
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s 
taxes.”6 Corporate directors and managers have a fiduciary duty to create as much 
wealth as possible for their shareholders.7 U.S. corporations are accomplishing that 
legal obligation by moving to a foreign jurisdiction, usually one that offers a much 
lower tax rate.8 Any government action aimed at preventing inversions runs con-
trary to free market principles, but more importantly, would result in a mandate for 
corporate directors to violate their fiduciary obligations by preventing a practice 
meant to generate more wealth for the company’s shareholders. 
Part two of this article will provide a definition of corporate inversions and 
explain the various ways companies structure these transactions. Part three 
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1.  Jacob J. Lew, Close the Tax Loophole on Inversions, WASH. POST (July 27, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jacob-lew-close-the-tax-loophole-on-inver-
sions/2014/07/27/2ea50966-141d-11e4-98ee-
daea85133bc9_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.5346b4453b39. Lew points out that recent inversions 
have not only been motivated by tax savings, but also “expressly justified by” tax considerations. Id. 
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cism/13120369/. 
 6. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 7. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized 
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for that end”). 
 8. Melissa Lucar, Corporate Inversions: The Fleeing Notion of an American Corporation, 15 U.C. 
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investigates the root causes of the corporate inversion phenomenon. Part four details 
the specific policies that the U.S. government has enacted in an attempt to limit 
inversions. Finally, part five consists of proposals designed to limit the incentive to 
invert rather than placing a barrier between directors and fiduciary compliance. 
II.  CORPORATE INVERSIONS 
A. Corporate Inversion Defined 
A now frequent and increasingly criticized phenomenon, corporate inversion 
is most simply defined as the reorganization of a U.S. corporation into a foreign 
entity.9 The U.S. Department of the Treasury provides that a corporate inversion 
occurs when “a U.S. based multinational restructures so that the U.S. parent is re-
placed by a foreign corporation, in order to avoid U.S. taxes.”10 This practice has 
been labeled an “inversion” because the acquiring company eliminates its own cor-
porate identity in order to preserve the target company’s identity—the opposite of 
the standard merger and acquisition transaction.11 
An inversion does not involve the physical relocation of the corporation; the 
transaction is more symbolic because the substantial change is reflected only in the 
business agreement.12 Generally, there is not any change in the corporation’s inter-
nal operations.13 After a U.S. corporation has inverted, its management and business 
operations usually remain in the U.S.14 The company is merely renouncing its U.S. 
citizenship so its economic activity is not disrupted.15 
B.  Approaches to Structuring a Corporate Inversion 
There are three principal methods a U.S. corporation can use to structure its 
inversion: “(1) meeting the substantial activit[ies] test; (2) merging with a smaller 
foreign company; or (3) [being acquired by] a larger foreign company.”16 The sec-
ond and third methods that require a merger can be achieved through a stock, asset, 
or drop-down transaction.17 
First, the substantial activities test is an exception to § 7874 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Under § 7874, a corporation is classified as “domestic,” and can 
thereby be taxed at the domestic rate, if the U.S. corporation owns 80% or more of 
a foreign corporation after the inversion.18 The substantial business activity 
                                                          
 9. Gregory Day, Irrational Investors and the Corporate Inversion Puzzle, 69 SMU L. REV. 453, 454 
(2016). 
 10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces First Steps to Reduce Tax Benefits 
of Corporate Inversions (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re-
leases/Pages/jl2647.aspx. 
 11. Day, supra note 9, at 454-55. 
 12. Lucar, supra note 8, at 267-68. 
 13. James Mann, Note, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of a Larger Problem, The Corporate In-
come Tax, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 524 (2005). 
 14. Lucar, supra note 8, at 268. 
 15. Wong, supra note 3, at 453. 
 16. Michael B. Cohen, Note and Comment, Avoiding Double Taxation and Expatriation: A Compre-
hensive Solution to FATCA and Corporate Inversion, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 595, 638 (2016). 
 17. Lucar, supra note 8, at 279. 
 18. Id. at 277-78. 
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exemption permits a company to invert “if it has substantial business activity in the 
country of reincorporation.”19 
Second, in an inversion where a smaller foreign corporation is acquired by a 
larger U.S. corporation, the merger is conducted to make the newly merged corpo-
ration subject to the foreign jurisdiction’s tax rate.20 After the merger is complete, 
the U.S. corporation becomes the majority owner of the foreign corporation, giving 
the U.S. based management team control of the foreign corporation.21 
The third method of inversion occurs when a smaller U.S. corporation merges 
with a larger foreign corporation. The U.S. corporation may be legitimately attempt-
ing to enhance foreign operations, irrespective of the possible tax benefits, when an 
entity chooses this transactional approach.22 The result of this merger is that the 
U.S. corporation assumes a minority ownership percentage in the merged com-
pany.23 This approach is distinct and more than symbolic because management is 
moved to the foreign parent’s headquarters.24 
As stated above, the inversions that can be achieved through a merger are com-
pleted by employing one of the following techniques: a stock, asset, or a drop-down 
transaction.25 A stock transaction is achieved when the shareholders of the U.S. 
corporation trade all their shares for equity in the foreign corporation.26 The out-
come of this transaction is that the foreign parent assumes ownership of the U.S. 
corporation and the now former shareholders of the U.S. corporation become ma-
jority owners in the existing foreign company.27 Practically speaking, all this trans-
action does is convert ownership.28 Normally, the foreign parent incorporates in a 
jurisdiction with low corporate rates as a holding company,29 while “the U.S. cor-
poration either becomes a subsidiary or transfers all its assets to the foreign par-
ent.”30 
Asset transfers are typically employed in smaller-scale inversions.31 An asset 
transaction can be structured in two different ways.32 The first approach employs 
the use of a continuation transaction to transform the U.S. parent corporation into 
the foreign parent by automatically merging the U.S. corporation’s shares into 
shares of the foreign corporation.33 The second approach is when every asset and 
liability of the U.S. corporation is transferred to a foreign corporation in exchange 
                                                          
 19. Id. at 278. 
 20. Id. at 279. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 278. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Scott DeAngelis, Note, If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them: The U.S. Solution to the Issue of 
Corporate Inversions, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 1359 (2015). 
 26. Joseph A. Tootle, Note, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business Activ-
ities”, 33 VA. TAX REV. 353, 363 (2013). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Eloine Kim, Note, Corporate Inversion: Will the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 Reduce the 
Incentive to Re-Incorporate?, 4 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 152, 161 (2005). 
 29. Tootle, supra note 26, at 363. 
 30. Kim, supra note 28, at 161. 
 31. Lucar, supra note 8, at 280. 
 32. Joshua Simpson, Analyzing Corporate Inversions and Proposed Changes to the Repatriation Rule, 
68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 673, 678 (2013). 
 33. Id. 
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for stock that the U.S. corporation liquidates in order to convey the surplus value to 
its shareholders.34 
A drop-down transaction or combined inversion,35 utilizes elements of both the 
former techniques.36 When a corporation uses a drop-down structure in exchange 
for stock, the U.S. corporation transfers its assets to the new foreign parent.37 In 
order to complete the transaction, the foreign parent transfers some of its recently 
acquired assets back to a domestic subsidiary.38 Following the completion of that 
transaction, the original U.S. corporation is defunct, but its former shareholders hold 
the same amount of equity in the new foreign corporation as they once held in the 
defunct corporation.39 
III.  CAUSES OF THE CORPORATE INVERSION PHENOMENON 
The U.S. has always been a target for corporate domicile, given its propensity 
to provide corporate safeguards in addition to the obvious size of its consumer 
base.40 These alluring attributes enabled the U.S. government to maintain a higher 
corporate tax rate without risking capital flight.41 However, the current tax structure 
is outdated, which creates an issue for U.S. multinational corporations because of 
the anti-competitive corporate tax rate relative to others competing in the interna-
tional arena.42 
The National Foreign Trade Council conducted a study in 2002 examining U.S. 
international tax policy and found that the U.S. is an undesirable location for a mul-
tinational corporation’s legal domicile.43 The report concluded that, “a significant 
modernization of the U.S. rules is necessary to restore competitive balance in the 
vastly changed circumstances of the global economy of the 21st century.”44 Corpo-
ration inversions are the product of the dated U.S. tax rules in an increasingly com-
petitive global economy.45 This leaves U.S. corporations at a disadvantage and is 
consequently a key factor in influencing a company’s decision to invert, thereby 
diminishing the burden imposed by the U.S. tax structure.46 
                                                          
 34. Id. 
 35. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1360. 
 36. Lucar, supra note 8, at 280. 
 37. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1360. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Heather Campbell, Note, When Good Tax Law Goes Bad: Stanley Works’ Recent Dilemma and 
How the Internal Revenue Code Disadvantages U.S. Multinational Corporations Forcing their Flight to 
Foreign Jurisdictions, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 95, 104 (2004). 
 40. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1361. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP & Washington Council Ernst & Young, Territorial 
Tax Study Report, NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL (June 11, 2002), http://www.nftc.org/de-
fault/Tax%20Policy/06_13_02_Territorial_Tax_Study_Report.pdf.pdf. 
 44. Kim, supra note 28, at 155. 
 45. Id. at 154. 
 46. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1361. 
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A. Territorial Taxation Versus Worldwide Taxation 
In a territorial system, income is taxed by the nation where the income origi-
nated.47 Under this system, offshore income is exempt from domestic tax collec-
tors.48 Most foreign countries only tax domestic-sourced income, which includes 
25% of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries.49 Except for the U.S., all six co-members of the G-7, a group of the seven 
largest economies in the world, use some form of a territorial tax system.50 Many 
countries have implemented provisions into their territorial system designed to stop 
companies from removing earned income to foreign jurisdictions, bypassing any 
potential domestic tax liability.51 
Conversely, the U.S. employs a worldwide taxation system.52 Under a world-
wide tax scheme, the country where a corporation is domiciled, taxes all income 
regardless of whether it is earned domestically or abroad.53 Under the U.S. tax struc-
ture, a levy on foreign corporations is imposed only on income-connected U.S. busi-
ness operations, an advantage that is unavailable to domestic corporations.54 In an 
attempt by the U.S. government to narrow this competitive gap, domestic corpora-
tions may claim a foreign tax credit on taxes paid to foreign countries if the income 
originates therein.55 The foundation of the foreign tax credit system is formulated 
by grouping a corporation’s income into specific and distinct classifications.56 Fol-
lowing this classification, the foreign tax credit is calculated by combining general 
and passive income.57 The foreign tax credit only applies to compulsory taxes (re-
quired taxes in foreign jurisdictions), therefore, voluntary taxes can incur double 
tax liability, as they do not qualify for the tax credit.58 
The U.S. applies a “place-of-incorporation rule” for defining a corporation as 
domestic or foreign.59 A corporation is domestic if it is organized under the laws of 
any state.60 Conversely, if the corporation is organized under a foreign jurisdiction’s 
laws, it is considered a foreign person under U.S. law.61 The foreign person distinc-
tion applies to any foreign subsidiary of a U.S. multinational.62 As a result, until 
foreign subsidiaries’ earnings are repatriated back to the U.S. parent, there is no 
domestic tax liability on the parent’s subsidiaries’ foreign-earned income.63 Once 
                                                          
 47. Chris Capurso, Note, Burgers, Doughnuts, and Expatriations: An Analysis of the Tax Inversion 
Epidemic and a Solution Presented Through the Lens of the Burger King Tim Hortons Merger, 7 WM. 
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 579, 584 (2016). 
 48. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1357. 
 49. James G.S. Yang, Corporate Inversions: Rules and Strategies, 27 J. INT’L TAX’N 37, 37 (2016). 
 50. Capurso, supra note 47, at 584. 
 51. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1357. 
 52. Capurso, supra note 47, at 584. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The Tension Be-
tween Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 
485-86 (2005). 
 55. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1599. 
 56. Cohen, supra note 16, at 632. 
 57. Id. (noting that general income is referring to “namely, active income”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Kirsch, supra note 54, at 485. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Tootle, supra note 26, at 358. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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the foreign-earned income is repatriated to the U.S. parent, it is taxed at the U.S. 
domestic rate.64 Domestic corporations are incentivized to defer potential domestic 
tax liability by leaving foreign income abroad and out of reach of the worldwide tax 
system.65 
B. U.S. Corporate Tax Rates 
During the 1980s, the U.S. corporate tax rate was relatively low among OECD 
countries.66 At the same time, multinational corporations were incorporating in the 
U.S. to gain access to its large consumer market and corporate legal protections.67 
Then the competition caught up from 1979 to 2002, and the average corporate tax 
rate fell from 43% to 29% among OECD countries.68 While this period of tax refor-
mation was occurring abroad, the U.S. lost its competitive advantage by failing to 
modify its corporate tax rate.69 President Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory 
Board warned that, “the growing gap between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the 
corporate tax rates of most other countries generates incentives for U.S. corpora-
tions to shift their income and operations to foreign locations with lower corporate 
tax rates to avoid U.S. taxes.”70 
The U.S. tax code received its last major reform in 1986.71 This government 
complacency has left the U.S. corporate tax rate (currently 35%) as the highest in 
the developed world.72 Accounting for state income tax, U.S. corporations could 
face a 39.1% tax rate.73 The anti-competitiveness of the U.S. corporate tax rate is 
one of the primary sources associated with inversions.74 Global variances in tax 
rates have consequences, namely, that it provides great incentives to transfer income 
to low-rate jurisdictions.75 An unintended consequence of such a high tax rate is 
that it reduces the profits of U.S. corporations, exposing domestic entities to a for-
eign takeover.76 
Another revelation that has hurt U.S. corporations is the reality that the U.S. 
government’s global competitors have been systematically reducing their corporate 
tax rates.77 The U.S. tax rate is not only higher than that of any other OECD country, 
it is also “higher than the 30[%] average among developing nations.”78 A study by 
a University of Calgary economists found that the U.S. federal and state tax rate on 
                                                          
 64. Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 814 (2015). 
 65. Id. 
 66. David M. Towarnicky, Stop Calling Inverted Companies “Unpatriotic:” It is Congress’s Patriotic 
Duty to Provide a Competitive Corporate Environment, 45 PUB. CONT. L. J. 163, 165 (2015). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. President’s Econ. Recovery Advisory Bd., The Report on Tax Reform Options: Simplification, 
Compliance, and Corporate Taxation, PROCON.ORG i, 69 (Aug. 2010), http://corporatetax.pro-
con.org/sourcefiles/PERAB-tax-reform-report.pdf. 
 71. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1596. 
 72. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 165 (emphasis added). 
 73. Yang, supra note 49, at 38. 
 74. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1598. 
 75. Yang, supra note 49, at 38. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Kim, supra note 28, at 156. 
 78. Id. at 157. 
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new capital investment, considering credits and deductions, was an uncompetitive 
35% compared to a 19.5% OECD average and an 18% global average.79 
C.  Increased Regulatory Burden 
Corporate inversions also allow companies to avoid the “thicket of complicated 
rules” that the U.S. regulatory environment imposes.80 A 2007 study found that the 
regulatory costs of being a public company headquartered in the U.S. caused 16% 
of such companies to consider a sale and 14% to consider a merger.81 In addition, 
the annual costs of regulatory compliance for firms incorporated in the U.S. is $1.75 
trillion.82 This marked an overall increase of 171% from 2001 to 2006 for firms 
with revenue under $1 billion, while firms with revenue over $1 billion experienced 
a 12% increase in compliance costs from 2005 to 2006.83 The U.S. approach to 
regulation relies on rules and compliance as opposed to a principles-based ap-
proach.84 
The U.S. regulatory system involves regulators at both the federal and state 
level, which is more complicated than countries with a single regulator, such as the 
United Kingdom (“U.K.”).85 Federal and state regulators are mandated by law to 
enforce their own regulations. As a result, it can take months to harmonize federal 
and state laws because the regulatory system has not been streamlined. As long as 
the U.S. regulatory system continues to be void of an overarching principle that 
instructs regulators on the approach to take toward supervision and enforcement, 
this inefficiency will continue to persist.86 Consequently, regulators are left with 
only one option: to promulgate regulations under the statutory authority delegated 
by outdated legislative mandates.87 These mandates have fallen behind the trends in 
today’s global economy because they are not subject to substantial review.88 This 
archaic regulatory framework has forced corporate executives to spend more time 
learning the purpose of each regulation and how it may impact their business.89 This 
lack of understanding has facilitated an uneasy view toward any new regulations 
that could drive up the cost of compliance even further.90 
The overarching legal market in which the regulatory environment operates 
strengthens its effectiveness. A legal market based on principles of fairness and 
                                                          
 79. The Send Jobs Overseas Act: Ending the Deferral of Foreign Income is Another Tax on U.S. Em-
ployment, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052748703384204575509700366289206. 
 80. Simpson, supra note 32, at 688. 
 81. Foley & Lardner LLP, Foley Study Reveals Continued High Cost of Being Public, FOLEY (Aug. 
2, 2007), https://www.foley.com/foley-study-reveals-continued-high-cost-of-being-public-08-02-2007/. 
 82. Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, SMALL BUS. 
ADMIN. i, iv (Sept. 2010),  https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of%20Regula-
tory%20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full).pdf. 
 83. Foley, supra note 81. 
 84. Michael R. Bloomberg & Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Finan-
cial Services Leadership, NYC.GOV i, 82 (Jan. 2007), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_fi-
nal.pdf. 
 85. Simpson, supra note 32, at 693. 
 86. Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 84, at 83. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (noting that the cost of compliance in the securities industry increased $12 billion from 2002 
to 2005). 
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predictability is the second most important standard in determining the competitive-
ness of a financial center.91 The legal system in the U.S. may be deteriorating its 
established reputation as an epicenter for ingenuity.92 By simply shifting their list-
ings to overseas exchanges, corporations can avoid exposure to meritless securities 
lawsuits and subsequent settlements that increase the operating costs for U.S. busi-
nesses.93 The previous years have produced new highs in both the quantity and value 
of class action settlements in the security industry.94 Furthermore, due to federalism 
in the U.S., sanctions are seen as arbitrary since state and federal courts provide 
independent directives and outcomes depending on if the suit is brought by regula-
tors, government attorneys general, class actions, or individuals.95 This regulatory 
volatility imposes even further costs on U.S. entities.96 
D.  Corporate Debt: Interest Expense Deduction 
The U.S. treatment of interest expenses has provided another incentive for U.S. 
corporations to invert.97 Generally, interest payments on corporate borrowing can 
be incurred anywhere in the corporate group, irrespective of where the correspond-
ing benefit occurs.98 Accordingly, a domestic parent can obtain a loan, use such 
funds to capitalize “foreign-source income-producing activities, and claim [an] in-
terest deduction” in the domestic parent’s country of incorporation for offshore in-
come.99 This interest deduction decreases the corporation’s domestic tax liability, 
while allowing the corporation to use funds freed by the deduction to grow opera-
tions outside the country of incorporation.100 
In the U.S., however, it is difficult to take advantage of this interest deduction. 
Since it is difficult to apportion interest expenses, the Internal Revenue Code dis-
tributes the expense “across the corporate group on a pro rata basis [based on each 
entity’s] total assets.”101 This method of allocation is costly for multinationals that 
disproportionately borrow from U.S. lenders, which results in entities minimizing 
and effectively avoiding these costs by reincorporating overseas.102 
E. Income Shifting: Earnings Stripping 
The majority of tax benefits that corporations are able to receive from inver-
sions are the product of post-inversion techniques, such as income shifting.103 In-
come shifting is a technique that multinational corporations utilize to report income 
earned from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction that offers a more advantageous 
                                                          
 91. Simpson, supra note 32, at 694. 
 92. Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 84, at 71. 
 93. Id. at ii (noting that this is an increase in both actual and apparent operating costs). 
 94. Simpson, supra note 32, at 694. 
 95. Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 84, at 17. 
 96. Simpson, supra note 32, at 694. 
 97. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, VI. Drawing Lines Around Corporate Inversion, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2270, 2277 (2005) [hereinafter Harv. Ass’n]. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 2278. 
 103. DeAngelis, supra note 25, at 1362. 
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corporate tax rate.104 The income is transferred through inter-company payments in 
various forms of interest payments, “management fees, licensing fees, or royal-
ties.”105 An accounting study found that “despite managements’ claims that inver-
sion-related tax savings will be due to the avoidance of U.S. tax on foreign earnings 
. . . most of the tax savings is attributable to the avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S. 
earnings [through earnings stripping].”106 
Earnings stripping is a common income shifting technique.107 Earnings strip-
ping occurs when a corporation pays excessive interest amounts to related third-
parties as a way to reduce its taxable income.108 In an earnings stripping transaction, 
a foreign parent corporation lends money to its U.S. subsidiary.109 Following the 
loan, the subsidiary can deduct from its taxable income the subsequent interest pay-
ments made to the foreign parent as a business expense, thereby reducing its do-
mestic tax liability.110 Similarly, the U.S. corporation could make tax-deductible 
royalty, management, or administrative expense payments to the foreign parent.111 
As previously discussed, the U.S. worldwide tax structure levies tax on foreign 
corporations only on domestically generated income.112 Consequently, the outcome 
of the earnings stripping transaction is the shifting of the subsidiary’s U.S. gener-
ated income out of the U.S., in the form of interest payments, to the newly formed 
foreign parent.113 The benefit of an earnings stripping transaction is immediately 
apparent to the corporation because any previous U.S. source taxable income is 
modified to a U.S. source expense, permitting a multinational to shift U.S. profits 
to offshore jurisdictions out of the reach of U.S. tax collectors.114 Earnings stripping 
transactions are a significant incentive to invert and gross the largest tax savings 
among inversion transactions.115 
IV.  GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO INVERSIONS 
It is not illegal to effectively utilize tax laws to lessen tax liabilities owed to the 
U.S. government.116 Nevertheless, critics of the practice maintain that inversions 
are not within the spirit of the law because the goal is to gain a tax advantage, as tax 
                                                          
 104. Id. 
 105. Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic Implications, 
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 338 (2004). 
 106. Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Through 
Corporate Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 805, 806 (2004) (outlining the pervasiveness of earnings stripping 
in inversion transactions). 
 107. Tootle, supra note 26, at 361. 
 108. Earnings Stripping Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.usle-
gal.com/e/earnings-stripping/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2017). 
 109. Lucar, supra note 8, at 271. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Derek E. Anderson, Turning the Corporate Inversion Transaction Right Side Up: Proposed Leg-
islation in the 108th Congress Aims to Stamp Out Any Economic Vitality of the Corporate Inversion 
Transaction, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 267, 281-82 (2004). 
 112. Lucar, supra note 8, at 269. 
 113. Damian Palleta, Treasury Could Target ‘Earnings Stripping’ in Inversion Hunt, WALL ST. J.: 
WASH. WIRE  (Aug. 6, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/08/06/treasury-could-tar-
get-earnings-stripping-in-inversion-hunt/. 
 114. Tootle, supra note 26, at 362. 
 115. Seida & Wempe, supra note 106, at 805 (analyzing the impact of earnings stripping transactions 
on four corporations that completed inversions in 2002). 
 116. Wong, supra note 3, at 455. 
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inversions were expected to reduce government revenue by over $2.2 billion in 
2015.117 Furthermore, according to a Congressional Budget Office report, inver-
sions were expected to cost the U.S. Treasury $19.5 billion in lost tax revenue over 
the next decade.118 
Based on the above figures, the Treasury Department has taken the position 
that “there is no policy reason to permit a domestic entity to engage in an inversion 
transaction when its owners retain a controlling interest in the resulting entity, only 
minimal operational changes are expected, and there is significant potential for sub-
stantial erosion of the U.S. tax base.”119 The potential loss of government revenue 
prompted Congress to introduce more than 30 bills to combat corporate inversion 
transactions in the early 2000s.120 
A. Government Contracts: Section 835 of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, and the Fed-
eral Acquisition Regulation 
The Department of Homeland Security was formed in 2002 following the en-
actment of the Homeland Security Act.121 As part of the Act, Congress was to dis-
courage corporate inversions through the federal procurement process.122 Section 
835 of the Act deters corporate expatriations by preventing the company from ac-
quiring lucrative government contracts.123 Section 835 explicitly provides that 
“[t]he Secretary [of Homeland Security] may not enter into any contract with a for-
eign incorporated entity which is treated as an inverted domestic corporation.”124 
By passing the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Congress extended the 
contracting prohibition against inverted domestic corporations to other federal 
agencies.125 In the succeeding appropriation acts and continuing resolutions, Con-
gress instituted government-wide statutory prohibitions on the use of appropriated 
funds to contract with inverted corporations.126 
                                                          
 117. Id. 
 118. Memorandum from Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation, to Karen 
McAfee, Chief Tax Counsel, House Comm. On Ways and Means (May 23, 2014), available at 
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/113-
0927%20JCT%20Revenue%20Estimate.pdf. 
 119. Zahrt, supra note 2, at 1595. 
 120. Kirsch, supra note 54, at 496. 
 121. Douglas Chiu, Inversion Subversion: Corporate Inversions and the New Federal Laws Against 
Them, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 717, 726 (2015). 
 122. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 168. 
 123. Chiu, supra note 121, at 726-27. 
 124. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2227 (2002) 
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 295(a) (2012)). 
 125. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 168. 
 126. Prohibition on Contracting with Inverted Domestic Corporations, 80 Fed. Reg. 38309, 38310 (July 
2, 2015) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 9 and pt. 52). In FY 2009, the prohibition was continued by § 
743 of Division D of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11-8, § 743, 123 Stat. 524, 
692 (2009); in FY 2010, by § 740 of Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-117, § 740, 123 Stat. 3034, 3215 (2009); in FY 2012, by § 738 of Division C of the Consol-
idated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 738, 125 Stat. 786, 938 (2012); in FY 2014, 
by § 733 of Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 733, 128 
Stat. 5237 (2014); and, most recently, for FY 2015, by § 733 of Division E of the Consolidated and 
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 733, 128 Stat. 2130, 2386 
(2014). 
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The current ban is a result of the Federal Acquisitions Regulation, which pro-
hibits the use of appropriated funds for contracting with any “foreign incorporated 
entity [that] is treated as an inverted domestic corporation . . . or [with] any subsid-
iary of such an entity,” as defined in 6 U.S.C. § 395(a).127 The statute calls for a 
foreign incorporated entity to be treated as an inverted domestic corporation, 
[i]f (1) the entity completes . . . the direct or indirect acquisition of sub-
stantially all of the properties [of a] domestic corporation; (2) after the ac-
quisition, at least 80% of the stock . . . of the entity . . . is held . . . by former 
shareholders of a domestic corporation; and (3) . . . the entity does not have 
the substantial business activities in the foreign country in which [it is now 
incorporated].128 
This statute will be discussed further in the following section. 
Despite these Congressional attempts at preventing inversions, inverted com-
panies continue to receive federal government contracts.129 Many companies have 
effectively taken advantage of loopholes in order to procure federal contracts by 
claiming in private legal briefs that their company has not met the standard to be 
characterized as an inverted domestic corporation.130 These loopholes run the gamut 
from military exchanges that do not receive appropriated funds, to maintaining 
equipment on military bases, or even winning contracts during periods of temporary 
lapses in the ban.131 A 2014 study found that over 12 former U.S. corporations that 
inverted “collect[ed] more than $1 billion a year” procured from the U.S. Treasury 
in the form of federal contracts.132 
B.  The American Jobs Creation Act and Section 7874 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2002 (“AJCA”) amended nearly 600 code 
sections, which made it the largest revision since the 1986 Tax Reform Act.133 The 
AJCA added § 7874, the most formidable barrier to inversion transactions, to the 
Internal Revenue Code after Congress had become aware that a number of multina-
tional businesses with U.S. parent entities inverted to a corporate structure with for-
eign ownership.134 The law includes provisions to punish inversions by levying tax 
penalties on corporations that undergo such transactions.135 
Section 7874 only applies to corporate inversions if a certain percentage of for-
mer shareholders of the U.S. company own stock in the foreign parent company, or 
the “surrogate foreign corporation” in the statute’s language.136 A corporation is a 
                                                          
 127. 6 U.S.C. § 395(a) (2012). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Towarnicky, supra note 66, at 169. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 171. 
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 133. Kim, supra note 28, at 163. 
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 135. Kim, supra note 28, at 164. 
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“surrogate foreign corporation” if: (1) it “directly or indirectly acquires substan-
tially all the properties of a domestic corporation,” and (2) post-transaction is at 
least 60% of the foreign corporation’s stock as a result of its equity in the domestic 
corporation.137 If accountings show that a corporation’s “expanded affiliated group” 
138 (“EAG”)  has substantial business activities in a foreign country relative to the 
total business activities of the foreign group, the entity does not meet the statutory 
standard of a “surrogate foreign corporation.”139 “In a[n] inversion transaction, the 
foreign parent company is [normally] a surrogate foreign corporation.”140 Section 
7874 is applicable if the former shareholders of the U.S. corporation constitute an 
ownership rate of at least 60% in the foreign parent undertaking the acquisition.141 
In addition, special rules are in place when the former shareholders of the inverted 
corporation own 80% of the foreign parent,142 these rules will be explored below. 
1. 60% Inversions 
Congress viewed 60% inversion transactions as having a limited tax affect, yet 
warranting restriction to guard against the erosion of the U.S. tax base.143 “60% 
inversions are likely [the result of] either mergers with established foreign corpora-
tions or partial sales to unrelated individuals”—dissimilar from the pure inversions 
that prompted public outrage and the enactment of § 7874.144 
If, after the inversion transaction, former shareholders of the U.S. operating 
corporation own at least 60%, but less than 80% of the foreign parent, then § 7874 
considers the foreign corporation to be a “surrogate foreign corporation.”145 This 
structure imposes partial tax liability on the U.S. corporation based on a special gain 
recognition requirement that limits some taxes of the U.S. corporations for an “ap-
plicable period” that applies after the inversion is initiated to ten years after its con-
clusion.146 The “inversion gain includes any gain on property or stock transferred 
to the foreign parent, and any licensing income from that property, without offset 
for losses or credits other than the foreign tax credit.”147 
The provision pertaining to inversion gain is a deterrence mechanism, aimed at 
preventing corporations with existing losses and credits from undergoing opportun-
istic inversions.148 Section 7874 achieves this deterrence, regardless of the 
                                                          
 137. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 138. Id. § (c)(1) (explaining that an “expanded affiliated group” is defined by § 1504(a), which includes 
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 140. Tootle, supra note 26, at 369. 
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 143. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 108-192, at 142 (2003) (“The Committee believes that other inversion trans-
actions [involving greater than 50 but less than 80 percent identity of stock ownership] may have suffi-
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corporation’s tax structure,  through the nullification of any offset associated with 
existing losses and credits that would otherwise be available.149 The strength of this 
deterrence can be determined by observing whether the corporation has operating 
losses or credits alternative to those applicable to the foreign tax credit.150 
If the U.S . . . corporation has neither, its inversion gain will not exceed its 
taxable income and the provision [is irrelevant;] if the U.S. corporation has 
a . . . small amount of losses or credits other than the foreign tax credit, its 
inversion gain will [only slightly] exceed its taxable income.151 
In the latter case, the company’s taxable income does not prevent corporations 
that engage in a 60% inversion from earning many of their tax benefits through 
techniques such as interest allocation or earnings stripping.152 
2. 80% Inversions 
If former shareholders of the U.S. corporation own 80% or more of the stock 
in the new foreign parent following the inversion, the corporation will be exposed 
to much harsher tax treatment.153 Section 7874 treats the new foreign parent corpo-
ration as a domestic corporation despite its foreign address,154 and any foreign-
source income is considered to be domestic income within reach of U.S. tax collec-
tors.155 The classification in § 7874 eliminates the tax benefits associated with an 
inversion transaction.156 The multinational corporation will still incur tax liability 
under the U.S.’s worldwide tax regime, every potential earnings stripping transac-
tion with the foreign parent will be futile, and the foreign parent will then be within 
the jurisdictional reach of the U.S.157 
3. Substantial Business Activities 
The legislative history underlying the various statutes that codified an overt 
hostility toward inversions establishes “that § 7874 was enacted to [dissuade] in-
versions to tax-haven jurisdictions, where . . . multinational [corporations would] 
not have substantial business activities” relative to their global operations.158 Sec-
tion 7874 contains a “substantial business activities” exemption, where a corpora-
tion is not a surrogate foreign corporation if its expanded affiliate group has sub-
stantial business activities in the foreign country when compared to the total busi-
ness activities of the group.159 Attempts of inverting companies to elude § 7874’s 
treatment of 80% inversions by qualifying for the substantial business activities 
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 150. Id. at 369-70. 
 151. Id. at 370. 
 152. Id.; see generally I.R.C. § 7874(d)(1). 
 153. Tootle, supra note 26, at 369-70. 
 154. I.R.C. § 7874(b). 
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exception is purely financial since the exemption renders § 7874 inapplicable and 
permits the corporation to obtain the full tax benefit of the inversion.160 
However, the statute offers no specifics regarding the activities that constitute 
substantial business activities.161 Congress delegated the power to interpret substan-
tial business activities to the Treasury through two statutory sources, § 7874(c)(6) 
and § 7874(g).162 Section 7874(c)(6) obliges the Secretary of the Treasury to “pre-
scribe such regulations as may be appropriate to determine [whether] a corporation 
is a surrogate foreign corporation.”163 Section 7874(g) compels the Secretary of the 
Treasury to “provide such regulations as are necessary to carry out [the] section, 
including regulations providing for such adjustments to the application of [the] sec-
tion as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of [the] section.”164 
Under this authority, the Treasury has promulgated numerous regulations, both tem-
porary and permanent, outlining and defining the standard associated with the sub-
stantial business activities exception.165 
C.  Department of the Treasury and other Executive Branch Actions 
Despite this legislation, several U.S. corporations have still been able to con-
duct financially successful inversions.166 Instead of fleeing to traditional offshore 
tax havens, companies are now inverting to countries where they have substantial 
business activities such as Canada, Ireland, and the U.K.167 Since 2004, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury has promulgated various regulations instructing the text of § 
7874 to be read in a manner that restricts inversions conducted by merging a do-
mestic entity with a foreign corporation.168 
1.  2006 Treasury Regulation 
In 2006, the Treasury Department promulgated a temporary regulation that in-
terpreted § 7874.169 This regulation clarified the ambiguity of the “substantial busi-
ness activities” test by setting forth a clear standard.170 To satisfy the “substantial 
business activities” standard, the activity must meet either of the following tests: 
(1) the “facts-and-circumstances” test, or (2) the safe harbor test.171 
The “facts-and-circumstances” test identifies the existence of substantial busi-
ness activity related to the worldwide activities of the corporate group.172 The 
worldwide activities determination is made on a case-by-case basis, analyzing the 
factors and facts of the individual case.173 The “safe harbor test” depends on the 
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 163. I.R.C. § 7874(c)(6). 
 164. Id. § (g). 
 165. Tootle, supra note 26, at 378. 
 166. Wong, supra note 3, at 457. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. T.D. 9265, 2006-2 C.B. 1 [hereinafter T.D. 9265]. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
15
Thompson: Solving Corporate Inversion Phenomenon
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
No. 2] Thompson; Solving Corporate Inversion 571 
activities of the corporation’s EAG.174 The EAG is the resulting entity after the in-
version, which makes up the foreign and domestic corporation.175 The “safe harbor 
test” deems a corporation to have substantial business activities automatically if the 
foreign corporation accounts for at least 10% of their EAG’s (1) employees, (2) 
assets, and (3) sales in a 12-month period.176 
2.  2009 and 2012 Treasury Regulations 
The IRS and Treasury Department promulgated Treasury Regulation 9453 in 
2009.177 Regulation 9453 amended the 2006 Treasury Regulation that attempted to 
clarify the “substantial business activities” test.178 Regulation 9453 removed the 
safe harbor test while maintaining the “facts-and-circumstances” test in its original 
form.179 Consequently, eliminating the safe harbor test made it much more difficult 
to determine what constituted a “substantial” business activity under 7874.180 
Following the 2009 regulation, the Treasury Department enacted Treasury 
Regulation 9592 in 2012.181 This regulation further amended the 2006 Treasury 
Regulation concerning the test for substantial business activity.182 Reversing the 
2009 regulation, this regulation removed the “facts-and-circumstances” test and re-
placed it with a new version of the “safe harbor test.”183 For the purpose of clarity, 
the new safe harbor test deems there to be substantial business activity relative to 
the total business activities of the corporation group worldwide only if the foreign 
corporation accounts for at least 25% of both the foreign and domestic corporations 
in: (1) employees, (2) assets, and (3) sales in a 12-month period.184 
3.  2014 Treasury Notice 
In 2014, the Treasury Department issued an official Treasury Notice aimed at 
the second prong of § 7874, which concerns ownership and control.185 For owner-
ship to be under 60% in the foreign corporation and 80% in the newly created entity, 
which protects U.S. corporations from tax liability under § 7874, corporations must 
either dilute their domestic control or inflate the total foreign ownership.186 
Section 2.02 of the regulation is characterized as an anti-dumping provision. 
This characterization is derived from its operational effect, which is to prevent U.S. 
corporations from paying out non-ordinary or “extraordinary dividends,” thereby 
diluting domestic ownership, in the period preceding the inversion.187 Moreover, 
“[a] dividend is considered non-ordinary if it is 110% greater than the average from 
                                                          
 174. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-2T(d)(1) (2006). 
 175. I.R.C. § 1504(a) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.199-7(a) (2017). 
 176. T.D. 9265, supra note 169. 
 177. T.D. 9453, 2009-28 I.R.B. 114. 
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the year before”; this is also known as a “skinny-down” dividend.188 If a domestic 
corporation’s dividend payout is within three years of the inversion, § 2.02 omits 
these dispersals that attempt to dilute the domestic corporation’s size.189 
Section 2.01 of the regulation is an anti-inflation provision that prevents U.S. 
corporations from inflating the ownership in the foreign corporation by incorporat-
ing specified “passive assets,” resulting in a smaller ownership percentage.190 As-
sets that are not part of a corporation’s daily business operations are designated as 
passive assets.191 Examples of passive assets include “cash, cash equivalents, or 
marketable securities.”192 Section 2.01 will disregard a segment of a foreign corpo-
ration’s passive assets, whose purpose is to artificially inflate the foreign corpora-
tion’s size, if those assets constitute at a minimum of 50% of the entity’s total as-
sets.193 
Additionally, the Treasury Notice disincentivizes U.S. corporations from in-
verting by eliminating post-inversion outlets access to foreign earnings without be-
ing subject to repatriation taxes.194 Before the promulgation of the 2014 Treasury 
Notice, U.S. corporations used inversions to take advantage of deferred earnings by 
employing maneuvers, which were allowed by the tax code, where the entity would 
leave income earned by the foreign corporation abroad, thereby beyond the reach 
of U.S. tax authorities.195 “The 2014 . . . Notice prevents three tactics . . . U.S. cor-
porations [commonly] use to access foreign income [while] avoid[ing] repatria-
tion.”196 “First, the [Notice] closed the loophole to ‘hopscotch’ loans . . . by treating 
[these] loans as U.S. property subject to [a] tax for a ten-year period following the 
date of the inversion.”197 A “hopscotch” loan enables the controlled foreign corpo-
ration to fund the acquisition by loaning cash to the targeted corporation—skipping 
the domestic corporation.198 
Second, the Notice endeavors to close the loophole for “decontrolling” trans-
actions whereby the EAG and controlled foreign corporation conduct a “stock-asset 
swap.”199 Following the swap, the EAG owns 50% or more of the controlled foreign 
corporation’s stock, making the controlled foreign corporation a foreign subsidiary 
of the EAG.200 The Notice prevents U.S. corporations from evading repatriation by 
recognizing the subsidiary in these transactions as a controlled foreign corporation 
if it occurs within ten years of the inversion date.201 Third, the Notice completely 
precludes a “spinversion” whereby the domestic corporation “spins off a portion of 
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its business or assets into a separate . . . subsidiary.”202 A foreign corporation then 
acquires the subsidiary by giving the shareholders stock in the foreign corporation 
that is subject to lower tax rates in the foreign country.203 The Notice eliminates any 
incentives and resulting tax benefits by classifying the spin-off company as a do-
mestic corporation.204 
4.  2016 Treasury Regulations 
The most recent regulations announced by the Department of the Treasury are 
intended to reduce companies’ incentive to avoid paying taxes through earnings 
stripping.205 The main thrust of the new regulations is to “limit inversions by disre-
garding foreign parent stock attributable to [certain prior] inversions or acquisitions 
of U.S. companies.”206 It is inconsistent with the intent of § 7874 to permit a foreign 
company to increase its size “to avoid the current inversion threshold for a subse-
quent . . . acquisition” of a U.S. entity.207 The 2016 regulation limits this practice 
by utilizing an inventive methodology for determining whether the post-acquisition 
ownership percentage indicates the transaction should be treated as an inversion.208  
The method determines ownership percentage by “exclude[ing the] stock of the for-
eign company attributable to assets acquired from [a U.S. entity] within three years 
prior to the signing date of the latest acquisition.”209 
In addition to the limits imposed above, this regulation also addresses earnings 
stripping by “targeting transactions that increase [the] related-party debt that does 
not finance new investment[s]” in the U.S. under § 385.210 The regulation makes it 
more difficult for foreign-parented groups to allocate related-party debt swiftly to 
their U.S. subsidiaries “following an inversion or foreign takeover, by treating as 
stock the instruments issued to a related corporation in a dividend or a limited class 
of economically similar transactions.”211 The regulation: 
(1) treat[s] as stock an instrument that might otherwise be considered debt 
if it is issued by a subsidiary to its foreign parent in a shareholder dividend 
distribution; (2) addresses a “two-step” version of a dividend distribution 
of debt in which a U.S. subsidiary (i) borrows cash from a related com-
pany, and (ii) pays a cash dividend distribution to its foreign parent; and 
(3) treat[s] as stock an instrument that might otherwise be considered debt 
if it is issued in connection with certain acquisitions of stock or assets from 
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related corporations in transactions that are economically similar to a div-
idend distribution.212 
Another aspect of this regulation issued under § 385 permits the IRS on audit 
to divide a purported debt instrument into part debt and part stock.213 This proposed 
regulation implements “statutory authority to treat an instrument issued to a related 
party as in part debt and in part equity to eliminate distortions” under the current 
law that treats instruments as either entirely debt or entirely equity.214 Finally, the 
new regulations require “documentation for members of large corporate groups to 
include key information for a debt-equity tax analysis.”215 This action requires com-
panies to “undertake certain due diligence and complete documentation up front to 
establish that a financial instrument is really debt.”216 Specifically, companies are 
required to document key information, “including a binding obligation for the issuer 
to repay the principal amount borrowed, creditor’s rights, a reasonable expectation 
of repayment, and evidence of ongoing debtor-creditor relationship.”217 “If these 
requirements are not met, instruments will be characterized as equity for tax pur-
poses.”218 
Finally, the 2016 regulations formalize two previous actions that the Treasury 
Department took to curb inversions.219 One addresses a technique that U.S. compa-
nies use to avoid § 7874 “by structuring an inversion as a multi-step transaction 
using back-to-back foreign acquisitions.”220 The other “requires a foreign subsidi-
ary of the inverted U.S. [corporate] group to recognize all realized gain upon certain 
post-inversion asset transfers that dilute the inverted U.S. group’s ownership of 
those assets.”221 
V.  PROPOSALS 
While politicians in the United States may describe companies that invert as 
unpatriotic or deserters,222 corporate officers and boards of directors have a duty of 
loyalty to the shareholders, which is independent of national loyalty.223 As stated 
above, the directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty essentially imposes an obligation to 
maximize profitability and stock value.224 A report published by the University of 
Chicago found that for inversions that took place in the two decades between 1993 
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and 2013, companies outperformed the market average in the subsequent years.225 
Given these results and the reality of global competition, corporate directors will 
have difficulty continuing as a U.S. domicile when an inversion into a foreign ju-
risdiction could produce millions in savings, which increases shareholder value.226 
In order to achieve these results without completely eroding the tax base, the U.S. 
government has the burden and obligation to create a more business-friendly envi-
ronment.227 The proposals below will do exactly that. 
A. Replace the Worldwide Tax Scheme with a Territorial Tax System 
Advocates of the U.S. worldwide tax system cite a benefits theory to justify an 
anticompetitive tax structure.228 The premise of the benefits theory is that favorable 
and predictably enforced property and contract laws, combined with advanced pub-
lic infrastructure, can validate the U.S. system—despite the fact it undeniably re-
sults in greater tax liability for domestic corporations.229 Additionally, proponents 
claim a worldwide tax structure creates an environment where it is advantageous 
for domestic businesses to keep their active investments in the U.S. instead of shift-
ing them abroad.230 
Despite these alleged benefits, Congress’s right to tax profits earned outside 
the U.S. is one of the primary reasons for the U.S. corporate exodus.231 U.S. multi-
national corporations are operating at an existing and overt competitive disad-
vantage as a result of the worldwide system since it allows U.S. tax collectors to 
reach profits earned offshore.232 Far from incentivizing investments, by punishing 
domestic incorporation, these costs and taxes actually induce entities to incorporate 
abroad.233 In addition, the worldwide system reduces the dividends that a U.S. com-
pany can distribute to its investors because the entity cannot repatriate the foreign 
earnings without domestic tax liability.234 Lastly, the current tax structure restricts 
investment of “productive capital” back into the U.S.235 Following an inversion, 
however, the corporation foregoes all tax liability, enabling the entity to invest for-
eign earnings into U.S. operations without being subject to additional U.S. taxes.236 
To keep American businesses competitive, congressional inaction is no longer 
an option. Although the majority of OECD countries have already adopted a terri-
torial system, which taxes only domestically earned corporate income, it is not too 
late for Congress to follow suit.237 The switch to a territorial system has the potential 
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to create more jobs and higher wages as a result of U.S. businesses increasing do-
mestic investment.238 Research has illuminated evidence of actual benefits when 
U.S. businesses are able to expand and invest overseas without the threat of addi-
tional taxes.239 More specifically, domestic investment increases 2.6% for every 
10% increase U.S. foreign investments.240 Domestic investment is required to sup-
port prospective foreign investments and typically results in the creation of new 
domestic jobs.241 Thus, the adoption of a territorial system would reduce the inver-
sion incentive because the system encourages a multi-layer domestic and global 
investment strategy that can cause domestic job creation and an increase in domestic 
wages.242 
B. Lower Corporate Tax Rates 
Lowering the corporate tax rates in the U.S. would assist in eliminating the 
incentive for U.S. multinational corporations to invert, while also helping to create 
an environment where these entities are able to generate revenue comparable to 
foreign multinationals without having to invert.243 Within the field of economics, 
there is a general consensus that a broad tax base with low rates is more advanta-
geous than a narrow tax base with high rates.244 As evidence, the U.S. corporate tax 
rate of 35%, the highest among OECD nations,245 generated approximately “half as 
much revenue . . . as the average OECD” country applying a corporate tax rate of 
approximately 29%.246 Lowering the corporate tax rate will broaden the tax base, 
eliminate incentives to expatriate, induce multinational corporations to incorporate 
in the U.S., and benefit the U.S. corporate tax base going forward.247 
If Congress is able to enact a lower corporate tax rate, the U.S. will align itself 
with other OECD rates, which will result in greater global competition.248 U.S. mul-
tinationals will only invert if it will result in positive returns.249 If the cost of invert-
ing exceeds the benefit, corporate inversions by multinationals will violate obliga-
tions to shareholders of maximizing profits.250 Decreasing the tax rate eliminates 
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the reason to invert because of the limited benefits of tax revenue savings.251 There-
fore, there will be less incentive to expatriate because the decrease in the mecha-
nism’s appeal is correlated to the decrease in the corporate tax rate.252 
1.  Case Study: The United Kingdom 
To illustrate the impact of these proposals, in 2009, the U.K. began enacting a 
series of reforms that resulted in the reincorporation of multinational companies and 
the growth of the Commonwealth’s corporate tax base.253 Two key reforms were 
aimed at stopping the inversion problem and creating a more attractive business 
environment: (1) reducing the corporate tax rate, and (2) moving to a territorial tax 
system.254 The corporate tax reform reduced the corporate tax rate from 30% in 
2009 to its present rate of 20%.255 
The results are staggering. U.S. corporations, such as Liberty Global, Rowan, 
Aon, and Ensco have reincorporated in the U.K.256 A 2013 Ernst & Young report 
found “approximately 60 multinational companies were considering relocating . . . 
a regional [or global] headquarters to the U.K.” due to the reduction in tax rates.257 
Furthermore, the move to a territorial tax scheme increased the competitiveness of 
corporations in the U.K. regarding international mergers and acquisitions.258 These 
reforms have also effectuated growth because U.K. corporations are growing by 
approximately 80% per year and are projected to surpass the total number of U.S. 
corporations by 2017.259 
Even more important from the standpoint of a government hesitant in enacting 
reforms, the U.K has consistently raised more corporate tax revenue than the U.S. 
when measured as a share of gross domestic product.260 These reforms have also 
produced a more stable economy: following the financial crisis in 2008, U.K. cor-
porate tax revenue was less affected, averaging 3% of GDP while the U.S. revenue 
averaged 2.2%.261 Furthermore, “[t]he U.K. now collects more revenue from non-
financial corporations than the U.S. does from all corporations.”262 
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2.  Case Study: Canada 
Actions taken by the Canadian government offers great insight into the benefits 
of a lower corporate tax rate. Since 2000, Canada has incrementally lowered its 
corporate tax rate from 43% to 26%.263 As the corporate tax rate has gradually de-
creased, Canada’s corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP has progressively in-
creased,264 averaging 3.3% as rates began to decline in 2000, compared to 2.6% 
over the preceding 12 years.265 Even more convincing, compared to the total corpo-
rate tax revenue as a percentage of GDP of the U.S., Canada has experienced 1% 
greater overall revenue.266 During this time, Canada’s revenue share has averaged 
3.3%, while the U.S. has averaged only 2.3%.267 
Firms are taking notice that Canada is open for business. For instance, compa-
nies such as accounting powerhouse KPMG, Spectra Energy Corp., and Tim Hor-
tons (who left Canada after being acquired by Wendy’s International, Inc. in 1995) 
have all moved back to Canada.268 Beyond these specific companies, the financial 
services industry began entering the Canadian market, bringing with it a large in-
flow of capital, to benefit from the obvious advantages of this business friendly 
environment.269 Canada is the perfect example of how a reduction in the corporate 
tax rate, which as demonstrated can actually increase tax revenue, at a minimum 
neutralizes any alleged loss in tax revenue by encouraging and stimulating eco-
nomic activity.270 
C. Changing the Definition of Corporate Tax Residence 
There are two primary tests for locating a corporation: (1) “the ‘place of incor-
poration’ (“POI”) rule, or [(2)] a version of the ‘real seat’ rule.”271 The U.S. uses 
the POI test,272 an advantage of which is that it requires no interpretation.273 The 
POI standard “lower[s] compliance costs, avoid[s] litigation risks, and can be easily 
administered, especially in cases that involve a complex chain of related corpora-
tions.”274 U.S. corporations have the option to invert due to the U.S.’s adherence to 
the POI system, which inverting companies avoid by incorporating in a foreign ju-
risdiction.275 The U.S. should adopt a residence test that employs two criteria for 
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determining a corporate domicile for the purpose of federal income tax. Under this 
test, the corporation will be treated as “domestic” if the corporation is “(1) managed 
and controlled from the U.S.; or (2) the securities of which are listed on a [stock] 
exchange in the U.S.”276 One benefit a standard set by a “management and control” 
test is that it presents more insight and transparency into the operational structure 
of the corporation and its actual “resident” status.277 Even more important, such a 
system would make the process more burdensome, which in turn would reduce the 
incentive to participate.278 
The U.K. uses a “substantive connection between the country and the taxpayer” 
in order to define “management and control” by looking to the board of directors, 
to determine “where high level decision-making occurs.”279 Additionally, in 1988, 
the U.K. set a criteria for companies incorporated in the Commonwealth that based 
the status of a corporation on its place of formal incorporation.280 Some civil law 
jurisdictions, most notably Sweden and Italy, use a multitude of factors such as the 
“[entity’s] place of incorporation, place of legal registry, or the location of the tax-
payer’s legal office location or headquarters” to determine corporate status.281 In 
Asia, Japan being the third largest economy in the world,282 uses the corporation’s 
headquarters to determine its domicile.283 Importantly, “[m]ost other countries, 
[namely] Germany and the Netherlands, [use] a combination of these methods.”284 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Corporate inversions have undoubtedly proven to be a difficult phenomenon to 
prevent. Throughout all attempts to curb the amount of inversions over the years, 
one truism has emerged: the executive branch cannot solve this problem alone. The 
solution to the inversion phenomenon lies in a comprehensive reformation of our 
tax structure and code. There has been a movement toward reformation. President 
Donald J. Trump recently said to a group of CEOs, “[w]e’re trying to get it [corpo-
rate tax rate] down to anywhere from fifteen to twenty percent.”285 This proposal 
has broad congressional support among republicans, including Speaker of the 
House Paul Ryan, whose “A Better Way” agenda has proposed a flat 20% corporate 
tax rate.286 
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These proposals are a step in the right direction. However, the President and 
Congress should not stop there. Lowering the corporate tax rate will produce results 
for America, as shown by the results achieved by Britain and Canada, however, to 
win the free market battle, the structure of America’s system of taxation must also 
be reformed. Despite a lower tax rate, the worldwide system of taxation will con-
tinue to incentivize U.S. multinationals to invert because of the additional burden 
imposed that multinationals in other jurisdictions with similar tax rates do not en-
counter. 
There needs to be a complete leveling of the playing field on all fronts. Such a 
widespread problem calls for bold action, not just a simple tax cut. The global econ-
omy is a competition and America is currently losing. As the former chair and CEO 
of Citibank Walter Winston said, “money goes where it is wanted, and stays where 
it is well treated.”287 Until the U.S. government institutes these reforms, money will 
continue to go where it is wanted and well treated, overseas. 
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